Anthropic ↔ GDS
Directly documented interface
Formal cooperation
Named parties enter a defined memorandum or research agreement; implementation separately documented.
undirected. undirected
Displayed claim → analysis (if present) → coded attributes → interface / instrument → atomic evidence → source version
Instrument and timeline
- Instrument
- Formal cooperation
- Bindingness
- Unknown; not inferred from announcement
- Announced
- 2026-01-27
- Observed by
- 2026-01-27 · day
- Effective period
- Unknown → Unknown
- Event
- Announced
- Status at cutoff
- unresolved/unknown
- Last confirmation
- 2026-01-27
Independent maintenance is an intended project outcome; it limits any claim of permanent supplier dependence.
- Pilot development does not establish general public deployment or achieved independent maintenance.
Status investigation
Checked 2026-09-12; assessed as of 2026-09-12. Last confirmation does not establish uninterrupted continuity.
- amendments
- unknown
- expiry
- unknown
- termination
- investigated within listed sources
- restrictions
- investigated within listed sources
- succession
- see succession.json
- conflicts
- Independent maintenance is an intended project outcome; it limits any claim of permanent supplier dependence.
Search queries
- "anthropic" "gds" cooperation 2026 amendment termination expiry status before:2026-09-13
Analytical assessment
No reviewed analytical conclusion is attached. This does not establish independence or absence of an institutional constraint.
Coded attributes
technical-control: shared-constrained
Practical ability to alter the model, its availability, or safeguards in the specified deployment. Contract clauses alone are insufficient.
Actor × exact model/deployment × period. Anthropic provision and replacement of Claude models for DoW, contrasted with deployed operational control; 2025–August 2026; assessed 2026-08-27.
Anthropic provides model artifacts and responds to feedback; DoW and cloud providers independently gate operational deployment. Existing deployed models are outside Anthropic technical alteration or shutdown. Consequential functions are divided across institutions, satisfying shared/constrained control without attributing a real-time veto.
Supporting evidence: court-model-provision court-update-gate . Counterevidence: contractual-control court-static-deployment
- Coding applies only to stated context and date, not a permanent institutional rank.
Published rubric anchors
- little-control
- No demonstrated practical control over the specified consequential operation, with affirmative contrary evidence.
- shared-constrained
- Consequential controls divided among actor, host, customer or enforceable technical constraints.
- substantial
- Actor demonstrably retains major development, update or access controls in this environment.
- dominant-lifecycle
- Actor demonstrably controls development, deployment, updates and access across the specified lifecycle without a consequential independent controller.
Unresolved when necessary evidence is missing or adjacent anchors cannot be distinguished. No numeric conversion. Absence requires affirmative remit or operational evidence, not missing sources.
Atomic evidence and exact sources
The project aims to equip GDS to maintain the assistant independently.
- Source
- GOV.UK assistant development partnership · Anthropic
- Version
- 2026-01-27; retrieved 2026-09-12
- Exact locator
- Government engineering and maintenance description
- Limit
- Intended capability, not demonstrated independence; model-service substitution remains unestablished.
Retrieved bytes SHA-256: 4323ab90776d87aca6bde10789fcf738265ef8595e903e8508aa32b47987dc92
Anthropic could not technologically enforce contractual usage restrictions and lacked direct visibility into DoW use.
- Source
- Anthropic v DoW: summary judgment, document 250 · US District Court, Northern District of California
- Version
- 2026-08-27; retrieved 2026-09-12
- Exact locator
- Printed page 6
- Limit
- Specific deployed environment; does not imply no control over future development, contracts or provision.
Anthropic announced that its engineers would work alongside GDS civil servants and developers on a GOV.UK assistant.
- Source
- GOV.UK assistant development partnership · Anthropic
- Version
- 2026-01-27; retrieved 2026-09-12
- Exact locator
- AI for UK government services that puts safety first, paragraph beginning “A central goal”
- Limit
- Pilot development does not establish general public deployment or achieved independent maintenance.
Retrieved bytes SHA-256: 4323ab90776d87aca6bde10789fcf738265ef8595e903e8508aa32b47987dc92
The court describes deployed DoW Claude models as static and beyond Anthropic technological access, alteration or shutdown.
- Source
- Anthropic v DoW: summary judgment, document 250 · US District Court, Northern District of California
- Version
- 2026-08-27; retrieved 2026-09-12
- Exact locator
- Printed page 17, Section II.F, first paragraph
- Limit
- Applies to deployed models described in this litigation, not future model provision or hosted consumer services.
The court records that replacement Claude models undergo third-party cloud-provider and DoW security testing and evaluation before operational approval.
- Source
- Anthropic v DoW: summary judgment, document 250 · US District Court, Northern District of California
- Version
- 2026-08-27; retrieved 2026-09-12
- Exact locator
- Printed page 17, Section II.F, first paragraph
- Limit
- Identifies a deployment approval gate, not complete interpretability, universal evaluation sufficiency or provider substitutability.
The court records Anthropic providing models to DoW or a primary defense contractor and responding to DoW evaluation feedback and requests.
- Source
- Anthropic v DoW: summary judgment, document 250 · US District Court, Northern District of California
- Version
- 2026-08-27; retrieved 2026-09-12
- Exact locator
- Printed page 17, Section II.F, first paragraph
- Limit
- Provision is distinct from control over deployed inference; future supply terms and update alternatives are unspecified.
Supporting and conflicting evidence
Interface support: e-anthropic-gds-pilot. Counterevidence: gds-maintenance-intent
Substantive review
evidence/gds-maintenance-intent: approved · agent reviewer codex-research-checker · 2026-09-12
The same announcement presents GDS independent maintenance as a project objective. This counters permanent-dependence inference but does not establish achieved substitution. Checked locator: Government engineering and maintenance description. Source version: 2026-01-27.
Approval fingerprint: 1e7930e6d70cddee066b09a959f5046c89228cfdbf91ecb37db5b43d6212271a
evidence/contractual-control: approved · agent reviewer codex-research-checker · 2026-09-12
Judgment page6 distinguishes contractual conditions from technical enforcement and use visibility in the specified environment; later provision and lifecycle control are expressly not excluded. Checked locator: Printed page 6. Source version: 2026-08-27.
Approval fingerprint: 1e7930e6d70cddee066b09a959f5046c89228cfdbf91ecb37db5b43d6212271a
instruments/i-anthropic-gds-pilot: approved · agent reviewer codex-research-checker · 2026-09-12
Named supplier/government assistant project is an announced cooperation instrument; completed development is not asserted.
Approval fingerprint: 1e7930e6d70cddee066b09a959f5046c89228cfdbf91ecb37db5b43d6212271a
relationships/anthropic-gds-pilot: approved · agent reviewer codex-research-checker · 2026-09-12
January27 sources explicitly name planned Anthropic/GDS engineering work. Formal cooperation is supported while public deployment, completed work and independent maintenance remain unproven.
Approval fingerprint: 1e7930e6d70cddee066b09a959f5046c89228cfdbf91ecb37db5b43d6212271a
evidence/e-anthropic-gds-pilot: approved · agent reviewer codex-primary · 2026-09-12
Independently inspected the primary source at the recorded locator. Narrow proposition, attribution, date/version and stated limit supported; conflicting access/technical/status accounts remain separate.
Approval fingerprint: 1e7930e6d70cddee066b09a959f5046c89228cfdbf91ecb37db5b43d6212271a
evidence/court-static-deployment: approved · agent reviewer codex-primary · 2026-09-12
Independently inspected the primary source at the recorded locator. Narrow proposition, attribution, date/version and stated limit supported; conflicting access/technical/status accounts remain separate.
Approval fingerprint: 1e7930e6d70cddee066b09a959f5046c89228cfdbf91ecb37db5b43d6212271a
evidence/court-update-gate: approved · agent reviewer codex-primary · 2026-09-12
Independently inspected the primary source at the recorded locator. Narrow proposition, attribution, date/version and stated limit supported; conflicting access/technical/status accounts remain separate.
Approval fingerprint: 1e7930e6d70cddee066b09a959f5046c89228cfdbf91ecb37db5b43d6212271a
evidence/court-model-provision: approved · agent reviewer codex-primary · 2026-09-12
Independently inspected the primary source at the recorded locator. Narrow proposition, attribution, date/version and stated limit supported; conflicting access/technical/status accounts remain separate.
Approval fingerprint: 1e7930e6d70cddee066b09a959f5046c89228cfdbf91ecb37db5b43d6212271a
institution-attributes/dod-claude-control: approved · agent reviewer codex-primary · 2026-09-12
Checked rubric and contextual evidence, including Augustcourt p17, MarchCIO pp27–29 and MaySenate pp59–68. Divided control is not remote veto; meaningful reliance is not structural indispensability; substitution ordinal remains unresolved.
Approval fingerprint: 1e7930e6d70cddee066b09a959f5046c89228cfdbf91ecb37db5b43d6212271a